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We integrate the seemingly contradictory theoretical predictions of behavioral and economic
perspectives about the relationship between pay disparity and firm performance and show that
tournament and social comparison theories are more supplementary than contradictory in nature.
Our results show that high levels of firm performance will be found around either meaningfully
low or meaningfully high levels of pay disparity. Additional findings indicate that this curvilinear
relationship is weakened in the presence of both an heir apparent and high CEO power, and
strengthened when top management team members are more eligible as CEOs. These findings
suggest that factors that increase or inhibit social comparison or tournament perceptions among
TMT members play a role in the strength of the curvilinear relationship between pay disparity
and firm performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The distribution of executive rewards within
organizations has long been a subject of research
and debate in the organizational theory, economics,
finance, and strategic management literatures.
In this broad set of interconnected literatures,
a pattern of seemingly contradictory theoretical
traditions and results emerge about the relationship
between pay disparity—or the size of the observed
differences between chief executive officer (CEO)
incomes and those of other executives in the top
management team (TMT)—and firm performance.
Some scholars, particularly within the economics
and finance traditions, find that pay disparity is
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positively related to firm performance (Eriksson,
1999; Lin and Lu, 2009; Mondello and Maxcy,
2009). However, pay disparity is also found
to have a negative effect on firm performance
by research primarily within the organizational
theory and management traditions (Fredrickson,
Davis-Blake, and Sanders, 2010; Henderson and
Fredrickson, 2001; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005).
Given this inconsistency in findings, it could be
concluded that the overall link between executive
pay disparity and firm performance is either not
meaningful or is contingent on the organizational
context (Bloom and Michel, 2002; Henderson and
Fredrickson, 2001; Pfeffer and Langton, 1993;
Siegel and Hambrick, 2005; Wright et al., 2005).
While these views seem plausible, the ques-
tion of the general relationship between pay dis-
parity and firm performance still raises several
theoretical and empirical issues that require addi-
tional research attention. First, there is scarce
large-sample research evidence of the relationship
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because most empirical studies have been con-
ducted on specialized samples (i.e., Bloom, 1999;
Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990). Second, the theo-
retical background for arguing for either a positive
or a negative relationship between pay dispar-
ity and firm performance may not have yet been
addressed in full. In particular, researchers do not
seem to have addressed some of the main theoret-
ical propositions of the underlying theories (e.g.,
the similarity hypothesis in social comparison and
the size of the prize in tournament theory) that
point to an integrative rather than competitive uti-
lization of both theories to explain the relationship
between pay disparity and firm performance.
In this study, we seek to address these issues by
first integrating the seemingly contradictory theo-
ries of the relationship between pay disparity and
firm performance. Previous research in both the
behavioral and economics traditions study social
comparison and tournament theories as if they
were steadily contradictory to each other—that
is, as if one consistently dampened firm perfor-
mance through reduced collaboration in the TMT
and the other consistently strengthened firm perfor-
mance through increased competition in the TMT.
To the best of our knowledge, no attempts have
been made to integrate both views. We argue that
economic logic (tournament theory as presented by
Lazear and Rosen, 1981) is mostly relevant when
the level of pay disparity is high enough to incite
competition for a prized trophy (the CEO posi-
tion). Also, behavioral logic (social comparison as
presented by Festinger, 1954) is primarily relevant
when the level of pay disparity is not high enough
to disrupt comparison effects. Accordingly, social
comparison and tournament theory can supplement
each other at different levels of pay disparity while
remaining internally consistent with their theoret-
ical traditions. Specifically, we propose and find
that high levels of firm performance will be found
around either meaningfully low or meaningfully
high levels of pay disparity.
We then address the important and tangible
effects of several factors related to the perceived
opportunity for succession of TMT members to
the CEO position on the relationship between pay
disparity and firm performance. Specifically, we
consider the moderating effects of both structural
aspects of the organization (having an heir appar-
ent or CEO power) and various characteristics of
TMT members that are relevant to their potential
to be named CEOs (TMT members’ eligibility for
promotion). For example, we expect limited if any
tournament effects in organizations where an heir
to the CEO position exists, because naming a suc-
cessor symbolically ends the current tournament
without starting a new one. These effects are fun-
damental to our understanding of the effect of pay
disparity on firm performance not only because
they extend our understanding of the main hypoth-
esized curvilinear relationship, but also because
they serve as empirical tests of the core assump-
tions of our theorizing (Miller and Tsang, 2011).
As such, they may provide internal support to
the mechanisms of tournament theory and social
comparison theory as relevant explanations of the
relationship between pay disparity and firm per-
formance. We use longitudinal data on execu-
tive compensation, TMT members’ characteristics,
and organizational succession planning and per-
formance among publicly traded North American
firms listed in the Fortune 500 to help integrate
management and economic explanations of the
relationship between pay disparity and firm per-
formance and provide quasi-experimental tests of
the implied theoretical mechanisms.
WHEN TOO MUCH OF A DIFFERENCE
MAKES A DIFFERENCE
Both social comparison and tournament theories
speak directly to pay disparity (or size of the
observed differences between CEO incomes and
those of other executives in the top management
team) and firm performance (Henderson and
Fredrickson, 2001; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005).
According to social comparison approaches
(Crosby, 1976; Festinger, 1954), individu-
als engage in social comparisons to evaluate
their rewards (Adams, 1965; Henderson and
Fredrickson, 2001; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005)
and experience relative deprivation when they
perceive that they receive less in comparison
to similar others (Cowherd and Levine, 1992;
Crosby, 1976; Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, and
Sanders, 2010; Siegel and Hambrick, 1996),
particularly those in higher organizational ranks
(Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001). Because of
the public nature of the compensation of the CEO
and the highest paid members of the TMT, across
rank comparisons between CEO pay and the pay
of the highest paid members of the TMT are likely
to exist (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Siegel
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and Hambrick, 1996, 2005). When such compar-
isons exist, large pay gaps are likely to reduce
commitment to organizational goals, cohesiveness,
satisfaction, efficient information processing, coor-
dination, and collaboration, leading to lower firm
performance (Cowherd and Levine, 1992; Martin,
1981; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). Therefore,
according to theory and evidence on the social
comparison tradition, large pay gaps between the
CEO and the TMT diminish firm performance.
On the contrary, in tournament theory
approaches, the high-paying CEO position is
seen as the prize of a succession tournament to
which members of the TMT have a claim. Because
large prizes are inherently motivating (Becker and
Huselid, 1992; Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990),
higher paying differentials at the CEO level will
result in improved efforts, reduced shirking, and
better alignment between efforts and organiza-
tional interests (Green and Stokey, 1983; Hen-
derson and Fredrickson, 2001; Lazear and Rosen,
1981; Main, O’Reilly, and Wade, 1993). There-
fore, according to theory and evidence in the tour-
nament theory tradition, large pay gaps between
the CEO and the TMT increase firm performance.
We argue that research based on these theories
can benefit from addressing some previously
overlooked fundamental theoretical aspects that
suggest they have complementary rather than
opposing theoretical predictions for the relation-
ship between pay disparity and firm performance.
First, the core proposition in Festinger’s (1954)
social comparison theory is that individuals will
compare themselves with similar others (Wood,
1989). This “similarity hypothesis” is not acknowl-
edged by applications of social comparison theory
to the relationship between pay disparity and firm
performance. But it is a fundamental aspect of
both social comparison theory and the relative
deprivation theories used to make the connection
between pay disparity and firm performance
(Martin, 1981; Siegel and Hambrick, 1996).
Relative deprivation is also theoretically targeted
at a “similar other” so that individuals tend to
want what similar others possess (Cartwright and
Harary, 1956; Crosby, 1976). The issue with pay
disparity and the similarity hypothesis is that pay
disparity will dramatically affect perceptions of
similarity. Top executives tend to have much in
common (Hills, 1980; O’Reilly, Main, and Crys-
tal, 1988; Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock, 2006) and
comparisons between them are strengthened or
weakened by perceptions of similarity in a variety
of attributes like age, tenure, status, power,
performance, and pay. A large pay disparity
diminishes perceptions of similarity because it is
indicative of differences in executives’ perceived
power (Finkelstein, 1992), status (Finkelstein,
Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009; Frank, 1984),
and inherent performance (Lambert, Larcker, and
Weigelt, 1993). A CEO who is rewarded with
very large pay disparity in comparison to the TMT
may be an example of the powerful taking more
for themselves (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996)
or a recognition of performance expectations or
status, that makes that CEO inherently different
from his/her top team and therefore less relevant
as a choice for social comparison. In line with
the referent choices literature criteria, pay is a
very visible, relevant, and available source of
information (Kulik and Ambrose, 1992) about one
executive’s performance relative to others (e.g.,
the CEO) and is therefore readily available for
people to use in selecting referents for comparison
or targets for tournament.
We argue that this ease of use of pay as referent
selection criteria combined with its implications
for power, status, inherent performance or other
differentiating characteristics makes it one more
important criterion for referent choice. Since
power, status, and perceptions of performance
are relevant surrounding indicators of similarity
available for comparison, and since objective
standards are usually unavailable (Martin, Suls,
and Wheeler, 2002) or mostly disregarded when
comparing to others (Martin, 1981), high paid
members of a TMT will not see CEOs who
enjoy very large gaps in pay as “similar others.”
In fact, people tend to compare themselves with
others who are above but close to them in rank
order (e.g., Wheeler et al., 1969). Therefore, social
comparison and relative deprivation theories have
limited predictive ability about the effects of
pay disparity on performance when the levels
of pay are high enough to reduce perceptions of
similarity. A CEO who enjoys very large pay gaps
compared to the highest paid members of the TMT
is less likely to be seen as a social comparison
target for them and therefore is less likely to result
in relative deprivation perceptions for them.
Second, as Henderson and Fredrickson (2001:
98) discuss, tournament theory was developed to
“explain the very large gaps typically observed
between the pay of CEOs and the pay of
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executives directly below them.” By looking
at a consistent effect of pay disparity on firm
performance, researchers fail to address the fact
that the theory only applies to the incentive
effects of “large first-place prizes,” “very large
gaps” in pay, “extreme succession tournaments”
in which there is significant pay inequality at
the top level, and the “disproportionate weight in
the purse” of the tournament (Lazear and Rosen,
1981; Main et al., 1993; Rosen, 1986; Siegel and
Hambrick, 2005). Therefore, tournament theory
makes limited if any predictions for medium to
low levels of pay disparity.
Consistent with these arguments, we see tourna-
ment theory as a complement to social comparison
approaches at high levels of pay disparity. As the
gap in pay between CEOs and the highest paid
members of the top management team becomes
large, the incentive to advance in the tournament
will rule over the relative deprivation effects of
social comparison in these high paid members of
the TMT who have been shown to be achieve-
ment oriented, power seeking, and status driven
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). We,
therefore, combine the social comparison predic-
tions of a negative relationship between pay dis-
parity and firm performance at low to medium
levels of pay disparity with the tournament theory
predictions of a positive relationship between pay
disparity and firm performance at high levels of
pay disparity. Consistently we expect decreasing
performance as pay disparity increases from small
to moderate and increasing performance when pay
disparity increases from moderate to high and tour-
nament effects become active. This will result in
high performance at both low and high levels of
pay disparity and low performance at moderate
levels of pay disparity, where the negative effects
of social comparison have negatively affected per-
formance levels and the tournament effects are yet
not relevant to help organizational performance.
Figure 1(a) shows the opposing predictions of
social comparison and tournament theory about
the relationship between pay disparity and firm
performance. Figure 1(b) shows the complemen-
tary predictions of both theories according to this
reformulation (shown in gray) and the expected
combined curvilinear relationship between pay dis-
parity and firm performance (shown in bold).
Therefore, we expect that high firm performance
will be found around either meaningfully low
or meaningfully high levels of pay disparity and
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Figure 1. (a, b) Theoretical integration of social com-
parison and tournament theory
that performance will decrease consistent with
social comparison theory until the point at which
tournament effects reverse the trend creating low
performance or the bottom curve of a U at
moderate levels of pay disparity.
Hypothesis 1: Firm performance will have
a U-shaped relationship with executive pay
disparity .
Our hypothesis—that tournament theory-type
incentives take over the relationship between pay
disparity and firm performance as pay disparity
becomes large can be further explored and tested
by studying the conditions that may affect TMT
members’ participation in succession tournaments
and their effect on performance. To the extent that
a tournament may cease to exist as, for example,
in the presence of an heir apparent, then we should
not expect to see tournament-like incentives take
over the relationship between pay disparity and
firm performance. On the other hand, to the extent
that TMT members can see themselves as more
likely to be elected as, for example, when they
share the characteristics of the CEO at the time of
his/her appointment as CEO, then we would expect
tournament-like effects to be stronger and at lower
levels of pay disparity.
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POSTPONEMENTS
TO THE SUCCESSION TOURNAMENT:
THE HEIR APPARENT
The most common form of succession planning
in corporate America is the selection of an heir
apparent (Vancil, 1987). This process is generally
referred to as a “relay succession” in which the
heir apparent is selected by the organization well in
advance of a succession event and the subsequent
time period is utilized to “groom” the heir apparent
for the top job. The selection of an heir apparent
has both substantive and symbolic consequences
for TMT members (Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993;
Cannella and Shen, 2001; Shen and Cannella,
2002; Zajac and Westphal, 1996). Consistent with
Hypothesis 1 in which we argue for a positive
tournament-like effect to take over the negative
social comparison effects of pay disparity on firm
performance at high levels of pay disparity, we
argue here that, in the presence of an heir apparent,
such tournament-like effects will either not exist or
be greatly diminished.
When an organization implements a process of
succession planning in which an heir apparent is
crowned, the opportunity of advancement for other
TMT members is obviously diminished. The heir
apparent is selected by the CEO and is deemed
to be the second-in-command, beginning a power
transition period (Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993).
While the heir apparent may not always be pro-
moted in the end, the appointment of a successor
will have political and behavioral implications for
other TMT members (Cannella and Shen, 2001).
In line with predictions from tournament theory,
because the election of an heir apparent eliminates
or at least significantly reduces the opportunity to
win the CEO succession tournament for non-heir
TMT members, the incentives to TMT members
predicted by tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen,
1981) will thus be removed by the election of an
heir apparent. In essence, the presence of an heir
apparent signals an end of the current succession
tournament and therefore diminishes or cancels
the emergent tournament effects at high levels of
pay disparity. Thus, we expect the presence of
an heir apparent to eliminate or at least greatly
reduce the tournament effects of pay disparity on
firm performance. Additionally, we do not expect
the presence of an heir apparent to affect feelings
of deprivation based on social comparison effects.
Therefore we expect that in the presence of an
heir apparent social comparison effects are going
to reduce performance as pay disparity grows and
will persist in the absence of positive tournament
effects. In the presence of a heir apparent we
expect a mostly negative rather than U-shaped rela-
tionship between pay disparity and performance.
The presence of an heir apparent will moderate
the U-shaped relationship between pay disparity
and firm performance so that the presence of an
heir apparent will reduce the increasing pattern of
performance at high levels of pay disparity.
Hypothesis 2: Executive pay disparity will have
a U-shaped relationship with firm performance
in the absence of an heir apparent and a
negative relationship with firm performance in
the presence of an heir apparent .
CONSTRAINTS TO THE SUCCESSION
TOURNAMENT: CEO POWER
We argue that power differential between the CEO
and the CEO’s top team will have a significant
effect in terms of the tournament incentives of
pay disparity for TMT members. CEO power will
have meaningful implications for TMT member
incentives as predicted in tournament theory. Pow-
erful CEOs are reluctant to abdicate (Sonnenfeld,
1986; Vancil, 1987; Zajac and Westphal, 1996) and
CEO power is visible to others in the TMT when
there are, for example, significant differences in
power in the form of different ownership positions,
titles within the organization, or pay differentials
between the CEO and the members of the CEO’s
top team (Finkelstein, 1992). In line with predic-
tions from tournament theory, because CEO power
constrains or postpones the opportunity to win
the CEO succession tournament for less power-
ful TMT members, the incentives for TMT mem-
bers predicted by tournament theory (Lazear and
Rosen, 1981) will be lessened or invalidated in the
presence of large power differentials between the
CEO and the CEO’s top team. Thus, CEO power
implies a significant constraint to the succession
tournament. The perceived time horizon for suc-
cession will significantly reduce tournament-type
incentives for TMT members in the presence of
powerful CEOs. Because we do not expect CEO
power to affect feelings of deprivation based on
social comparison effects, we expect that under
high CEO power, comparison effects are going to
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reduce performance as pay disparity grows and
will persist in the absence of positive tourna-
ment effects. Therefore, under high CEO power,
we expect a mostly negative relationship between
pay dispersion and performance because, in orga-
nizations with powerful CEOs, tournament-like
effects will be significantly weaker or even nonex-
istent. CEO power will moderate the relationship
between executive pay disparity and firm perfor-
mance weakening tournament effects.
Hypothesis 3: Executive pay disparity will have
a U-shaped relationship with firm performance
when CEO power is low and a negative relation-
ship with firm performance when CEO power
is high.
SIMILARITY ENHANCES SOCIAL
COMPARISON AND TOURNAMENT
PARTICIPATION: TMT MEMBER
ELIGIBILITY
TMT eligibility or the similarity in relevant charac-
teristics between the CEO and the CEO’s top team,
we argue, will have a significant effect in terms
of both social comparison effects and tournament
incentives of pay disparity for TMT members.
First, the “similarity hypothesis”, a core proposi-
tion in Festinger’s (1954) social comparison the-
ory states that individuals will compare themselves
with similar others (Wood, 1989), implying that
feelings of relative deprivation due to social com-
parison emerge from comparisons with a “similar
other” so that individuals tend to want what simi-
lar others possess (Cartwright and Harary, 1956;
Crosby, 1976). The issue with TMT eligibility
to the CEO position and the similarity hypothe-
sis is that TMT eligibility will dramatically affect
perceptions of similarity between TMT members
and the CEO. Previous research shows that insider
succession potential (i.e., CEO eligibility) is posi-
tively related to the maintenance of CEO charac-
teristics (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991) and that
firms tend to repeat previous guidelines in electing
their CEOs (Ocasio, 1999). Consistent with these
findings, insider successors who would not imply
changes in CEO characteristics would be more eli-
gible as CEOs, but this similarity will make them
more likely to compare socially their income to
the income of the CEO. Eligible TMTs are more
similar to the CEO in organizationally relevant
characteristics and are therefore more likely to
experience relative deprivation in the presence of
high pay disparity between them and the “similar”
CEO. Therefore, social comparison and relative
deprivation theories have strong predictive ability
about the effects of pay disparity on performance
when TMT eligibility is high enough to enhance
perceptions of similarity. A CEO who is notice-
ably different compared to the highest paid mem-
bers of the TMT is less likely to be seen as a
social comparison target for them and therefore
is less likely to result in relative deprivation per-
ceptions for them. Having highly eligible, TMT
members can increase feelings of relative depriva-
tion in TMT members and their negative effects on
commitment to organizational goals, cohesiveness,
satisfaction, efficient information processing, coor-
dination, and collaboration that reduce firm perfor-
mance (Cowherd and Levine, 1992; Martin, 1981;
Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). Therefore, we expect
that social comparison effects, the downtrend in
the U-shaped relationship between pay disparity
and performance, will be stronger for firms with
highly eligible TMTs.
Second, when looking at tournament effects,
one important though under-researched aspect of
tournament theory is that the chances of winning
the tournament by being elected CEO affect
the pay disparity needed to create significant
tournament-like incentives for TMT members.
Previous research has shown, for example, that
a large pool of competitors will require larger
pay disparities in order to incentivize participants
because the number of competitors reduces each
individual participant’s chances of winning the
tournament by becoming CEO (Henderson and
Fredrickson, 2001; Main et al., 1993; O’Reilly,
Main, and Crystal, 1988). We focus here on how
the TMT members’ chances of winning the tour-
nament by being promoted to the CEO position
are affected by TMT member characteristics. As
previously stated, firms tend to repeat previous
guidelines in electing their CEOs (Hambrick and
Fukutomi, 1991) and therefore TMT members
who are most like the current CEO have an
increased probability of becoming the new CEO
(Ocasio, 1999). Consistent with these findings,
TMT members who would not imply changes
in CEO characteristics would be more eligible
as CEOs and therefore more responsive to the
tournament-like incentives of pay disparity. Since
eligibility will increase tournament-like incentive
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responsiveness to pay disparity, we argue that
the more eligible the members of the TMT are
for the CEO position, the lower the pay disparity
needed to incentivize performance and the larger
the incentive to perform at similar levels of
relevant pay disparity. TMT eligibility reflects the
comparison between the aggregated individual
level characteristics at the team level and the same
characteristics of the CEO. Applied to the curvi-
linear prediction of Hypothesis 1, in which we
argue for a positive tournament-like effect to take
over the negative social comparison effects of pay
disparity on firm performance at high levels of pay
disparity, we argue here that in TMTs with high
member eligibility such tournament-like effects
will be significantly stronger. TMT member
eligibility will therefore moderate the U-shaped
relationship between executive pay disparity and
firm performance so that higher TMT member
eligibility will strengthen both the social com-
parison effects of pay disparity on performance
and the tournament effects of pay disparity on
performance resulting in a significantly steeper
U-shaped relationship. Therefore,
Hypothesis 4: Under conditions of high TMT
member eligibility, the U-shaped relationship
between pay disparity and firm performance will
be more pronounced than under conditions of
low TMT eligibility .
METHODS
Sample
The population for this study includes all traded
firms listed in the Fortune 500 and based in North
America from 2003 through 2006. Following prior
research (e.g., Sanders, 2001; Wright et al., 2005;
Zajac and Westphal, 1996), (1) 197 firms were
excluded from the final sample because complete
demographics for CEO-TMT members or other
data were unavailable for more than one quarter
of the executives in each year (Jensen and Zajac,
2004; Westphal and Zajac, 1995) and (2) 76 firms
were excluded from the final sample because they
belonged to four-digit Standard Industrial Clas-
sification (SIC) categories for industries that are
highly regulated (e.g., life insurance companies,
financial institutions, utilities, government-owned
corporations) because governmental oversight may
influence the strategic choices made by these
firms and contribute to their unique data-reporting
requirements (McNamara, Aime, and Vaaler, 2005;
Wright et al., 2005). The firms in our sample were
selected from the Fortune 500 list in the start-
ing period and then tracked for the rest of the
study period, regardless of whether or not they
stayed on the Fortune 500 list. Our resulting sam-
ple yielded 227 firms, and t-tests revealed no
significant differences in size (measured as sales
or number of employees) or performance (mea-
sured as return on assets) between our sample and
the original population for the study. Data were
collected for all years following the implemen-
tation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the final
sample represents our sample of interest for the
years 2003–2006 with lagged years collected for
all predictor variables and additional lagged years
included for instrumentation processes. Demo-
graphic data were gathered from Mergent Online;
Marquis Who’s Who in Finance and Business; and
The Dun and Bradstreet Reference Book of Corpo-
rate Management . Data on executive compensa-
tion were gathered from the Standard and Poor’s
Execucomp database. Firm-level data were gath-
ered from COMPUSTAT.
Measures
Dependent variable
Performance was measured as the firm’s return
on assets (ROA) in year t + 1. ROA is a common
measure of organizational profitability that reflects
operational performance and was especially
relevant to our study for two reasons. We used
ROA as the performance measure in our study
because it captures the dimension of performance
that is more closely related to top management
team functioning—namely, whether management
has effectively deployed firm assets (Geletkanycz
and Hambrick, 1997)—and is independent of
market preferences like market-based measures
or financial efficiency considerations like equity-
based measures (e.g., Return on Equity [ROE]).
Therefore, ROA is a widely used measure of
operational performance that is relevant to the
hypothesized effects suggested by both social
comparison and tournament theorizing and has
been utilized in some recent studies that, like ours,
look at the effects on performance of members of
the CEO’s top team (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002;
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Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, and Sanders, 2010;
Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Henderson and
Fredrickson, 2001).
Independent variables
We follow previous research that defines pay
disparity as the difference in pay between the CEO
and the top four compensated executives in the
TMT (Carpenter, 2002; Carpenter and Sanders,
2002; Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, and Sanders,
2010; Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001). This
choice is consistent with previous research for
comparison purposes and accounts for the fact
that firms are required to report the compensation
of the top five paid executives, including the
CEO. As in previous research (Henderson and
Fredrickson, 2001) this mode of identification of
TMT members (i.e., the four top paid executives
below the CEO) may either omit TMT members
or include persons who are not part of the TMT.
However, this should not present a serious problem
because as Henderson and Fredrickson (2001: 103)
point out the sample firms were large, meaning
that “the difference in pay between a firm’s
CEO and the next highest-ranking executive is
typically quite large, and subsequent pay gaps are
much smaller and become smaller still if more
executives are considered (Lambert et al., 1993).
Consequently, the teams studied here may have
had other members, but including their pay would
likely have had little impact on the calculated size
of CEO pay gaps.” Specifically, we operationalize
Pay Disparity as total CEO compensation divided
by average total compensation of these TMT
members (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). We defined
total compensation as the sum of short-term and
long-term compensation because the exclusion
of long-term components of compensation would
considerably understate the remuneration provided
to each individual (Lambert et al., 1993). Short-
term compensation included salary and bonuses,
while long-term compensation was calculated
as the sum of restricted stock, stock options,
and long-term accounting-based incentive plans
(Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, and Sanders, 2010;
Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). We used the modified
Black-Scholes present value method computed by
Execucomp to value stock options (Fredrickson
et al., 2010).
Heir Apparent is operationalized as a dichoto-
mous variable with a value of 1 if two criteria are
satisfied if: (1) a TMT member other than the CEO
holds the title of president or COO or both and (2)
that person is more than four years younger than
the CEO. The value is 1 if both criteria are satisfied
and 0 otherwise (Hambrick and Cannella, 2004).
CEO Power is operationalized as both Titles
and Ownership power. These are characteristics of
the power of CEOs and TMT members suggested
in the literature as reflecting power within the
organization (Finkelstein, 1992). Specifically, we
collected both the number of titles of each
executive and CEO and the overall shares owned
by each executive and CEO (excluding options)
in each firm year. The power measures are
then the aggregate distance between the CEO
and each executive on both ownership level and
number of titles, respectively (Westphal and Zajac,
1995; Zajac and Westphal, 1996). Our measure
is a variant of the Euclidean distance measure
providing a scale invariant indicator of distance
between the CEO and TMT members on both
ownership and titles. Therefore, Title/Ownership
Power were measured as:
(
n∑
i=1
(
Si − Sj
)2
n
)1/2
where Si is CEO title/ownership in the current
year, Sj indicates TMT member j ’s title/ownership
in the current year, and n represents the total
number of non-CEO TMT members. Titles power
represents the distribution of structural power
related to the assignment of formal positions
and structures of decision control within the
organization. A higher number of official titles
has been associated with greater power (Harrison,
Torres, and Kukalis, 1988). We constructed the
measure as an Euclidian distance between the
CEO’s number of titles and TMT members’
number of titles to represent that the difference in
power between a CEO and his/her TMT increases
as the difference in the amount of titles increases.
The logic here is that a CEO will likely be more
powerful over a TMT member who is simply a
divisional senior vice-president than over a TMT
member who is a divisional senior vice-president
and also CFO. Similarly, TMT members will be
relatively less powerful when the CEO is also
president of a division. The measure combines
number of CEO titles which ranges from 1 to
6 with a mean of 2.26 and a standard deviation
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of 0.61, and TMT titles, which ranges from
1 to 4 with a mean of 1.65 and a standard
deviation of 0.39. Ownership power follows a
similar logic based on the traditional notion that
shareholdings represent power because they can
be either an outcome of power (Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1996) or a source of structural power,
reducing board pressures on the executive because
of the potential role in voting structures and
coalitions.
Previous research has shown that new CEOs
tend to resemble the prior CEO (Pfeffer, 1981;
Smith and White, 1987; Vancil, 1987). One impor-
tant aspect to consider in insider succession
potential is that they are positively related to
the maintenance of CEO characteristics (Ham-
brick and Fukutomi, 1991; Zajac and Westphal,
1996). Furthermore, because firms rely on past
precedence and institutionalized actions in select-
ing successor CEOs (Ocasio, 1999), we conceive
TMT eligibility as TMT characteristics that would
maintain the characteristics of the CEO at the time
she/he took office.
We examine three TMT eligibility measures
based on functional background, age, and tenure
characteristics of TMT members as compared
to their firms’ CEOs at the time they took
office. These particular characteristics were cho-
sen because they are considered to be significant
references for insider eligibility for promotion to
the CEO position and are very often used in the
corporate governance literature (Cannella et al.,
2008; Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001; Zajac and
Westphal, 1996). To construct measures of eligi-
bility based upon demographic characteristics (age
and tenure), we use the distance formula previ-
ously presented with the alteration of subtracting
each value from the highest value in the sam-
ple to convert it into a measure of eligibility
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Zajac and Westphal,
1996). CEOs’ organizational tenures were mea-
sured at the time they took office, and the tenure
of TMT members was measured in the focal year
t . Therefore, Age Eligibility and Tenure Eligibil-
ity provide a measure of similarity of the TMT
to the CEO on both age and tenure at the time
the CEO took office. Finally, Functional Eligibil-
ity was calculated as a variant of Blau’s (1977)
index of heterogeneity, modified following Zajac
and Westphal (1996). It was thus defined as (Pi)2,
where Pi is the proportion of CEO-TMT mem-
ber dyads sharing the i th category (Murray, 1989;
Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Zajac and Westphal,
1996). Therefore, the measure Functional Eligibil-
ity signifies the squared proportion of CEO-TMT
member dyads in which both individuals have
experience within the same functional area.
To determine functional area experience, func-
tional areas were classified into three cate-
gories: throughput functions, (operations, R&D,
and engineering); output functions (marketing and
sales); and peripheral functions (functional back-
grounds such as finance and law) (Hambrick and
Mason, 1984; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Follow-
ing previous assessments of individuals’ functional
backgrounds, the categorizations were assessed by
utilizing their current and prior job titles together
with other aspects of their employment histories
such as the organizations for which they worked
in the past (e.g., Chaganti and Sambharya, 1987;
Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Murray, 1989; West-
phal and Zajac, 1995).
Control variables
We included in our analysis several control vari-
ables that have been shown to have an impact on
firm performance. At the firm level, inertial ten-
dencies associated with Firm Size could influence
firm performance, and therefore it was included
as the logarithm of sales (Hannan and Freeman,
1984). Also at the firm level, Capital Investment
Activity (annual capital equipment expenditures
divided by sales) has been shown to be indica-
tive of coordination needs that influence executive
pay disparity effects (Henderson and Fredrick-
son, 2001); it was included in the analysis. It
has also been suggested that top executives in
highly diversified companies may be effectively
running autonomous businesses, therefore dimin-
ishing the amount of coordination of top exec-
utives needed in diversified organizations (Hill,
Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992; Michel and Hambrick,
1992). Therefore, Diversification was included as
a control and measured with the entropy measure
for total diversification (Palepu, 1985) such that
diversification = Pia ln(1/Pia), where Pia is the
proportion of a firm’s sales in business segment
i . We additionally include a control for industry
ROA, measured as the average return on assets for
firms in the same two-digit SIC code as the focal
firm. Finally, because firm performance may be
related to prior performance, Prior Performance
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was included as a control in our model and mea-
sured as the firm’s ROA lagged one year.
We also control for executive level effects. First,
CEOs who are outside successors may have differ-
ential impact on firm performance and TMT inte-
gration (Karaevli, 2007; Shen and Cannella, 2002).
Outsiders are sometimes appointed to the corpora-
tion for a short period of time in preparation for
becoming CEOs. Therefore, CEOs were coded as
insiders if they had been employees of the com-
pany for at least two years prior to becoming CEO;
otherwise they were classified as outsiders (Can-
nella and Lubatkin, 1993; Henderson and Fredrick-
son, 2001; Ocasio, 1999) and remain so in the
data. Additionally, CEO Duality is included as a
dichotomous variable with a value of 1 if the CEO
also held the position of board chair and 0 other-
wise (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). Also, we include
the average TMT Tenure and CEO Tenure since
this has been shown to affect firm-level perfor-
mance. Because our focus is comparison of TMT
members to the CEO, we control for possible com-
parison within the TMT by including TMT Pay
Dispersion , measured as the coefficient of varia-
tion of the pay of the TMT (excluding the CEO;
Fredrickson et al., 2010) as well as Educational
Attainment measured as the proportion of TMT
members who have achieved an MBA. Similarly,
we include a measure for TMT and CEO similarity
in Elite Education , measured as the proportion of
TMT member/CEO dyads in which both individu-
als possess a degree from an Ivy League university.
Our final controls measure the average compen-
sation of the TMT on both cash and long-term
pay. TMT Cash is measured as the average cash
compensation (cash and bonus) of the TMT, and
TMT long-term is measured as the average long-
term compensation (restricted stock, stock options,
and long-term accounting-based incentive plans)
of the TMT. Table 1 provides the means, stan-
dard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all
data pooled.
Data analysis
We use dynamic panel techniques to analyze our
data with firm and year fixed effects. In particu-
lar, we perform our analysis using the Arellano-
Bond method. This dynamic panel technique
is especially suited to analyzing autoregressive-
distributed lag models from panels with cross-
sectional units observed for relatively few time
periods like the panels that are typically used in
this area of research. The Arellano and Bond esti-
mator proceeds by transforming regressors through
differentiation and using the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) (Hansen, 1982) in its esti-
mation (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and
Bover, 1995; Greene, 2000). Our GMM estima-
tors include robust standard errors in all mod-
els. The GMM estimator treats the model as a
system of equations, one for each time period. The
equations differ only in their instrument/moment
condition sets. Relevant independent and endoge-
nous variables in first differences are instrumented
with suitable lags of their own first differences.
There are several advantages to this dynamic panel
approach in our estimation. First, it controls for
lagged values of the dependent variable as per-
formance outcomes are likely related to prior
levels of performance. The Arellano and Bond
estimator uses instrumental variables to address
the classic issue in standard fixed effect mod-
els in which including a lagged dependent vari-
able is problematic due to the large probability
for that lagged dependent variable to be corre-
lated with the error term (Greene, 2000). Second,
GMM estimation with robust standard errors pro-
vides better estimates in the presence of unknown
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in dynamic
panels (Arellano, 2003). Finally, since any inde-
pendent variables that are not strictly exogenous
become potentially endogenous because they may
be correlated to past and future realizations of the
error, it uses deep lagged values of relevant regres-
sors and exogenous variables as instruments of
the independent variables to deal effectively with
potential endogeneity in our model.
We performed Arellano-Bond tests for auto-
correlation and Hansen tests for the validity of
the instrumentation strategy. For all of the data
included in the paper we failed to reject the
null hypothesis of autocorrelation in the first-
differenced errors, which means that the Arellano-
Bond estimator in our application is asymptotically
consistent. Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation
were applied to the first-difference equation resid-
uals of the balanced matrix following the gener-
alized ms (Arellano, 2003: 121–123) version of
the original Arellano and Bond (1991) m2 test.
Second-order autocorrelation would indicate that
some lags of the dependent variable that are used
as instruments are endogenous, but the tests reveal
no such problem in our models (Arellano, 2003;
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Firm performance (%) 6.43 7.67
2 Prior performance (%) 6.56 8.03 0.48
3 Pay disparity 3.12 1.68 0.07 −0.02
4 Heir apparent 0.20 0.40 −0.04 −0.07 −0.03
5 Titles power 1.43 0.47 −0.05 0.04 −0.19 0.14
6 Ownership powera 7.76 73.30 0.05 0.05 −0.05 0.13 0.13
7 Functional eligibility 0.21 0.20 −0.01 −0.01 −0.05 0.02 0.00 −0.07
8 Tenure eligibility 23.15 5.97 −0.05 −0.11 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00
9 Age eligibility 27.43 5.03 0.11 0.07 0.12 −0.08 −0.05 −0.20 0.09 0.05
10 CEO tenure 17.72 11.88 0.13 0.16 −0.09 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.01 −0.17 −0.19
11 Outsider 0.33 0.47 −0.04 −0.11 0.07 0.03 −0.01 0.11 −0.08 −0.06 −0.01
12 Duality 0.76 0.42 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.05 −0.14 −0.09 −0.04 −0.15 0.07
13 Pay dispersion 0.37 0.24 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 0.09 0.04 0.00 −0.06 0.02 −0.20
14 TMT casha 1.60 0.94 0.04 0.16 0.02 −0.01 0.09 0.14 0.02 −0.05 −0.13
15 TMT long-terma 2.86 2.58 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.05 −0.05 −0.13
16 TMT tenure 13.98 7.28 0.12 0.18 −0.05 0.04 0.03 −0.05 0.03 −0.41 −0.02
17 Educational attainment 0.37 0.26 0.00 −0.02 −0.01 −0.04 −0.03 0.05 −0.05 0.01 −0.09
18 Diversification 0.64 0.66 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.02 −0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.10
19 Capital investment 0.06 0.05 −0.10 −0.09 −0.04 −0.01 0.02 −0.07 0.07 0.01 0.00
20 Industry ROA 6.05 3.98 0.43 0.57 0.03 −0.01 0.00 −0.04 −0.02 −0.07 0.11
21 Firm sizeb 9.44 0.92 −0.03 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.14 −0.11 0.02
22 Elite education 0.56 0.39 0.06 0.04 −0.02 −0.03 0.03 −0.02 0.08 0.02 0.09
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
12 Duality 0.12 0.07
13 Pay dispersion 0.04 0.00 −0.18
14 TMT casha 0.07 −0.03 0.00 0.13
15 TMT long-terma 0.10 −0.03 0.04 0.17 0.46
16 TMT tenure 0.49 −0.38 0.12 −0.04 0.02 0.09
17 Educational attainment 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.02 −0.13
18 Diversification 0.00 0.07 0.07 −0.04 0.05 0.04 −0.06 0.01
19 Capital investment −0.06 0.01 0.00 −0.04 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.04 −0.06
20 Industry ROA 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.13 −0.07 0.03 −0.23
21 Firm sizeb 0.16 −0.11 0.09 0.01 0.43 0.38 0.27 −0.02 −0.03 −0.06 0.06
22 Elite education 0.02 −0.12 −0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 −0.16 −0.08 0.00 0.07 0.11
a Scaled by 1,000.
b Logarithm.
Yamagata, 2008). Arellano-Bond tests are reported
for all GMM models in Tables 1 and 2.
Also, Hansen test statistics showed that the
moment restrictions in our models are valid or,
in other terms, that the instruments are exogenous.
The Hansen test is used to evaluate the validity of
instruments when robust standard errors are used
in the estimation of models to address potential
heteroscedasticity in the data. The Hansen test
was used to evaluate the validity of the moment
restrictions or, more simply put, to test that the
instruments are not correlated with the error and
therefore that the instrumentation of the model is
valid. This test actually tests the dual null that
(1) the instruments are not correlated with the
errors and (2) the instruments should not have been
included as explanatory variables in the model.
The statistic for the test under the null hypothesis is
distributed as chi-square with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of instruments minus the
number of predictors. Our tests show that our
restrictions are valid (we failed to reject the null
hypothesis) in all our models.
The combined results of our tests show that we
do not have autocorrelation in the first differenced
errors (i.e., the generalized ms (Arellano, 2003:
121–123) and that our instruments satisfy the
standard validity criterion, making us confident
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about the validity of our results, the handling of
potential endogeneity, and the adequacy of our use
of the Arellano and Bond estimator in our models.
To test the curvilinear interactions of Hypothe-
ses 2–4, we included product terms of our modera-
tors of interest for the linear as well as the squared
pay disparity terms (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). We
focused on the moderation of the squared terms
because they prevent misinterpretation of effect
resulting from additivity and linearity in correlated
variables (Cortina, 1993; George, 2005) in line
with similar investigations of curvilinear interac-
tions in the strategic management literature (e.g.,
Brown, Sturman, and Simmering, 2003; George,
2005; Richard, Murthi, and Ismail, 2007; Wu, Lev-
itas, and Priem, 2005; Zhang and Rajagopalan,
2010). Since multicollinearity was a potential
problem, we followed Aiken and West (1991) and
mean-centered each of the variables prior to the
creation of interaction terms. We further applied
the residual centering procedure because some of
our models included multiple two-way interaction
terms and a three-way interaction term to mini-
mize multicollinearity between the interaction term
(e.g., X 1X 2) and its constituent parts (e.g., X 1
and X 2) in testing curvilinear interactions (Jong,
Ruyter, and Wetzels, 2005; Lance, 1988). To do
so, we first regressed each interaction term on its
components and then saved the residuals for use
in our data analyses (Jong et al., 2005; Zhang and
Rajagopalan, 2010).
RESULTS
Table 2 reports the results for Hypotheses 1–3. We
first show the results for our base model (model
1), which includes all of our control variables.
Hypothesis 1 posits that firm performance will
have a U-shaped relationship with executive pay
disparity. As shown in model 2, the results provide
strong support for Hypothesis 1 with a negative
linear coefficient and a positive squared term
(0.137, p < 0.05). As illustrated in Figure 2, firm
performance has a U-shaped relationship with pay
disparity. These results are practically significant
because they show that, as pay disparity moves
two standard deviations above the mean in the
sample, firm ROA grows by 1.11 percent resulting
an additional 274 million dollars in profit for
the average firm in the sample while, at two
standard deviations below the mean in the sample,
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Figure 2. Association of pay disparity and firm
performance
firm ROA grows by 1.90 percent resulting in
469 additional million dollars in predicted profit
for the average firm in the sample. As the pay
disparity between the CEO and TMT widens
initially and consistent with social comparison
perspectives, we found that firm performance
suffers; but as pay disparity becomes meaningfully
large, we observed tournament-type predictions for
improved performance taking over the relationship
between pay disparity and firm performance. In
line with our theoretical development, high firm
performance is found around meaningfully low or
meaningfully high levels of pay disparity.
Hypothesis 2 addresses whether the presence
of an heir apparent will reduce the increasing
pattern of pay performance at high levels of pay
disparity, effectively testing whether the pattern
observed in Hypothesis 1 is due to tournament
theory-type incentives taking over the relationship
between pay disparity and firm performance as
pay disparity enlarges. As shown in model 3, the
interaction of the squared pay disparity terms and
the presence of an heir apparent are statistically
significant (−0.159, p < 0.05), providing strong
support for Hypothesis 2 (Cortina, 1993; George,
2005). Our results indicate that for firms without
an heir apparent, there is a tournament effect that
will increase predicted ROA by 1.30 percent or an
additional 321 million dollars in profits when pay
disparity moves two standard deviations above the
mean in the sample. In contrast, predicted ROA for
firms in which an heir apparent is present is lower
when pay disparity moves two standard deviations
above the mean in the sample indicating the lack
of a tournament effect in the presence of an
heir apparent. Figure 3 illustrates this curvilinear
interaction and shows that, in the presence of
an heir apparent, the relationship between firm
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performance and pay disparity does not turn
positive at high levels of pay disparity. This
lends support to the logic of tournament effects
as justification for the right arm of the U-shaped
relationship in Hypothesis 1; in the absence of a
tournament (when firms have an heir apparent),
tournament-like effects are not noticeable.
Similarly, models 4 and 5 provide general
support for Hypothesis 3. The negative and
significant interactions of the curvilinear pay
disparity term and both titles power (−0.082,
p < 0.01) and ownership power (−0.002, p < 0.01)
support the idea that CEO power attenuates the
tournament effects in the relationship between
pay disparity and firm performance. These results
indicate that CEO power inhibits tournament
effects and support our Hypothesis 3. Our results
indicate that, for firms in which CEOs have low
title power or low ownership power, there is a
tournament effect that will increase predicted ROA
by 1.38 or 6.4 percent, respectively, when pay
disparity moves two standard deviations above the
mean in the sample. In contrast, predicted ROA
for firms in which CEO power is high (i.e., both
title power and ownership power) is lower when
pay disparity moves two standard deviations above
the mean in the sample indicating the lack of a
tournament effect under conditions of high CEO
power. Figure 4a and b illustrate these effects.
Hypothesis 4 suggests that TMT member eli-
gibility for the CEO position strengthens the
U-shaped relationship between pay disparity and
performance, effectively implying that it increases
social comparison effects at low levels of pay dis-
parity and also increases tournament effects at high
levels of pay disparity. Models 6–8 in Table 3 pro-
vide general support for this hypothesis. We find
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Figure 4. (a) Effects of ownership power. (b) Effects of
titles power
positive and significant coefficients for the interac-
tion terms between the squared pay disparity term
and functional eligibility (0.371, p< 0.05), tenure
eligibility (0.009, p < 0.05), and age eligibility
(0.015, p < 0.05). Our results imply that the dif-
ference in social comparison effects between teams
with high and low top management teams eligibil-
ity is practically relevant since it implies a nominal
average difference in firm ROA of 1.40 percent
(1.81, 0.16, and 2.23% respectively). Similarly,
tournament effect differences between teams with
high and low top management teams eligibility is
practically relevant since it implies a nominal aver-
age difference in firm ROA of 3.8 percent (3.19,
4.19, and 4.04%, respectively) when pay dispar-
ity goes from the mean to two standard devia-
tions above the mean. Figure 5(a–c) illustrate these
curvilinear interactions and show that that the U-
shaped relationship between pay disparity and firm
performance is stronger for firms with top man-
agement teams with high eligibility. This is con-
sistent with the logic that increased TMT member
eligibility will result in both more social compar-
ison effects and more tournament-like incentives
(because of their potential to “win” the succession
tournament). The implications are discussed next.
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Table 3. Results for the effects of TMT eligibility on the relationship between pay disparity and firm performance
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Constant 13.725 (15.759) 16.470 (11.565) 21.426 (14.378)
Prior performance 0.335* (0.157) 0.287† (0.154) 0.183 (0.127)
CEO tenure 0.188† (0.096) 0.190 (0.137) 0.169† (0.093)
Outsider 2.279 (3.167) 1.082 (2.754) 1.037 (2.889)
Duality −3.596* (1.824) −3.212 (2.126) −4.090** (1.479)
Pay dispersion −0.579 (1.597) −1.162 (1.740) −1.759 (1.967)
TMT cash 0.334 (0.786) 0.607 (0.785) 0.642 (0.806)
TMT long-term 0.182 (0.186) 0.220 (0.218) 0.235 (0.182)
TMT tenure 0.042 (0.153) 0.119 (0.106) 0.151 (0.117)
Educational attainment 3.257 (3.975) 2.533 (3.256) 3.936 (4.012)
Elite education −2.036 (2.337) −1.570 (2.976) −0.963 (2.548)
Diversification −0.092 (1.337) −0.083 (1.506) −0.423 (1.873)
Capital investment 5.392 (13.992) 11.013 (19.984) −5.049 (16.951)
Industry ROA 0.444† (0.237) 0.505* (0.222) 0.522* (0.245)
firm size −1.278 (0.982) −1.527 (1.306) −1.718 (1.186)
Functional eligibility 2.856 (4.890) 1.654 (3.579) −0.406 (4.005)
Tenure eligibility −0.059 (0.143) 0.029 (0.118) −0.025 (0.140)
Age eligibility 0.050 (0.193) −0.013 (0.158) 0.002 (0.213)
Titles power −3.811 (2.739) −4.625* (2.124) −4.911* (2.321)
Ownership power 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.002)
Heir apparent −0.710 (2.424) −0.463 (2.638) −0.349 (2.437)
Pay disparity −0.005 (0.428) −0.404 (0.549) −0.407 (0.472)
Pay disparity2 0.032 (0.041) 0.088† (0.052) 0.073* (0.034)
Pay disparity × functional eligibility −0.585 (1.775)
Pay disparity2 × functional eligibility 0.371* (0.189)
Pay disparity × tenure eligibility −0.050 (0.042)
Pay disparity2 × tenure eligibility 0.009* (0.004)
Pay disparity × age eligibility −0.074 (0.071)
Pay disparity2 × age eligibility 0.015* (0.007)
AR (2) 0.97 0.87 0.80
Hansen 80.26 65.31 80.72
Wald χ2 369.27*** 139.74*** 314.70***
Standard errors in parentheses.
t —tests are all two-tailed.
†p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
DISCUSSION
Our main objective was to determine whether
seemingly contradictory predictions and findings
about the relationship between pay disparity and
firm performance could be theoretically resolved
and tested by integrating behavioral and economic
perspectives. We revisited the basis for both
tournament and social comparison theories and
acknowledged that, in their complete formulation,
they are more complementary that contradictory
in nature. We proposed and found that the
economic logic of tournament theory (Lazear
and Rosen, 1981) is most relevant when the
level of pay disparity is high enough to incite
competition for a prized trophy and that the
behavioral logic of social comparison (Festinger,
1954) is primarily relevant when the level of pay
disparity is not high enough to disrupt comparisons
between similar others. Consistent with our theory,
our results support a more complex, curvilinear
relationship (see Figure 2) where high levels
of firm performance are found around either
meaningfully low or meaningfully high levels
of pay disparity. Accordingly, the two theories
can supplement each other at different levels of
pay disparity while remaining internally consistent
with their theoretical traditions.
Our secondary objective was to extend research
on the effects of executive pay structures on firm
performance by considering the impact of a series
of conditions that might significantly affect social
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Figure 5. (a) Effects of TMT eligibility - age. (b)
Effects of TMT eligibility - tenure. (c) Effects of TMT
eligibility – functional background
comparison effects of the perceived existence of
a succession tournament or the chances of TMT
members winning the CEO position. We first
considered sociopolitical firm-level effects that
may imply a cancellation or postponement of
the tournament. Consistent with our theory, our
results demonstrated that the existence of an heir
apparent (and therefore the implicit absence of
a tournament) eliminates all tournament theory
effects on the relationship between pay disparity
and firm performance (see Figure 3). Similarly, we
found support for the idea that CEO power atten-
uates the tournament effects in the relationship
between pay disparity and firm performance.
We then considered executive characteristics’
effects at the firm level that may imply an
increased chance of TMT members’ socially
comparing themselves with the CEO because of
their similarity in relevant characteristics and also
being more willing to participate in the succession
tournament because of their increased probability
of winning it. We found that higher TMT eligibility
in terms of functional background, tenure, and age
results in both steeper social comparison effects
and steeper tournament-type effects.
These findings are fundamental to our under-
standing of the effect of pay disparity on firm
performance not only because they extend our
understanding of the main hypothesized curvilin-
ear relationship but also because they serve as
empirical tests of the core mechanisms of our the-
orizing (Miller and Tsang, 2011). For example,
by showing that when an heir apparent is present
there are no tournament-like effects in the relation-
ship between pay disparity and firm performance,
we provide additional support to tournament-type
incentives as mechanisms that increase firm per-
formance at high levels of pay disparity.
Our findings have relevant managerial and
governance implications for the design of
compensation between hierarchical levels as well.
In general, our results suggest that firms can
afford large or small levels of pay disparity but
should avoid intermediate levels. Furthermore, our
research suggests that companies should pursue
different compensation strategies contingent on
their particular sociopolitical context or their TMT
characteristics. For example, firms that engage in
succession planning may benefit from minimizing
pay disparity, and firms with many eligible TMT
members may benefit from even small increases
in pay disparity. Similarly, firms that have a
consistent pattern of large pay disparity may
benefit from avoiding explicit succession planning
or the appointment of high-power CEOs.
It is important to note that this study speaks
to a series of instabilities in the effects of pay
disparity on performance as the socio-political
mixes in CEO teams change. Going from a period
of operation under an appointed heir apparent to a
new situation in which the heir apparent is now
the appointed CEO seems to imply changes in
TMT behaviors that are quite responsive to their
potential to be promoted to the CEO position.
Since we are unable to track specific behaviors, it
is impossible to acknowledge how these changes
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happen, but an analysis of the sample shows that
there is probably a combination of tournament
reignition and TMT member changes engaging
in tournament behaviors affecting such apparently
volatile behavior. This is consistent with the fact
that both the duration of CEO appointments and
the period during which TMT members remain
eligible may imply that, for some TMT members,
the aspiration of promotion may not last more than
a couple of CEO successions and therefore the
tournament may be constrained in time.
The results of this study should be viewed in
light of its potential limitations. One is that it was
conducted within large North American firms.
Also, while the longitudinal design provided some
temporal stability to our results, our study was
restricted to a particular time period. Extensions
to this study should investigate whether firm size
or cultural views of compensation influence these
relationships and whether the findings vary under
a variety of temporal economic scenarios. For
example, pay structures may need to acknowledge
the resources of particular members of the TMT to
deal with situational environmental uncertainties
for the firm because such uncertainty reduction
resources have been shown to affect hierarchical
structures in teams (Aime et al., in press).
Similarly, it is important to study the implications
of pay, power, and similarity for executive
departures (Bloom & Michel, 2002) because there
is a growing interest in the relationship between
key players mobility and firm performance (Aime
et al., 2010). Therefore, future extensions may
benefit from considering the impact of both tour-
naments and social comparisons on the adjusting
nature of TMT teams.
Limitations aside, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study to address compensation
from an integrated multidisciplinary approach that
theoretically combines economic and behavioral
views. We provide evidence that executive pay
disparity has both social comparison and tourna-
ment theory implications for firm performance.
Additionally, we extend research on executive
compensation to show that a series of contin-
gencies (the existence of an heir apparent, CEO
power, or the characteristics of TMT members)
can significantly affect the implications of pay
disparity for firm performance. Our results suggest
that beyond a certain level of pay disparity, TMT
attention may switch from a focus on relative
deprivation to a focus on the attraction of a valued
prize and that such a shift in attention may be
influenced by a series of organizational contin-
gencies. This ultimately provides researchers with
new alternatives for investigating compensation
differences and their relationship to performance.
It also points to the need for more theory and
research regarding the complementary effects of
both social comparison and tournament theory at
different levels in the pay structure and under a
variety of alternative organizational contingencies.
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